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The paper discusses the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Relations between international organisations are, as a rule, characterised by both cooperation and
competition. Cooperation of the OSCE with NATO and the EU in Southeastern Europe reflects the
changes that have taken place in recent years among the main security structures in Europe. The OSCE
specificity is that all the 19 states members of NATO and the 15 states members of the European Union
also belong to the OSCE. For this reason, a concept of labour division emerged several years ago
among these three security structures. According to that concept NATO would deal with military aspects,
the EU would tackle politico-economic issues and the OSCE would focus on social and humanitarian
matters. As all 19 states members of NATO and the 15 states members of the European Union also
belong to the OSCE such division could not function and has not functioned for many reasons. The
OSCE's role in restoring stability is less spectacular than NATO military operations or EU economic
assistance though it is no less essential. It promotes the building of democratic institutions and the
shaping of security based on the respect for common values.
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1. Introduction
What is the role of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) among the main
security-related organizations in Europe? Relations be-
tween international organizations are, as a rule, charac-
terized by both cooperation and competition. It is the
case particularly when the mandate and tasks of organi-
zations encompass the same or similar spheres of activ-
ity. Cooperation finds its expression in official docu-
ments, agreements and declarations, and competition is
reflected in the day-to-day practice, particularly at me-
dium and lower levels. Sometimes it takes a shape of
overtly critical opinions addressed to each other; more
common, however, is to mutually diminish the role and
importance of rivalling organizations or merely ignore
each other.
Cooperation of the OSCE with NATO and the
EU in Southeastern Europe conforms only in part with
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the above-mentioned rules; indeed, it reflects in large
measure the advantageous changes that have taken place
in recent years among the main security structures in
Europe. The OSCE specificity is that all the 19 states
members of NATO and the 15 states members of the
European Union also belong to the OSCE. For this rea-
son, a concept oflabour division emerged several years
ago among these three security structures. According to
that concept NATO would deal with military aspects,
the EU would tackle politico-economic issues and the
OSCE would focus on social and humanitarian matters.
Such a division could not function and has not
functioned for many reasons. It did not, however, pre-
vent closer cooperation between the three structures. A
sui generis proving ground has become their collabora-
tion in Southeastern Europe.
Before addressing the subject of this presenta-
tion it is worth reminding the general norms and rules
guiding cooperation between the Organization and other
security institutions on the European continent.
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2. Helsinki II: new tasks
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
The decisions ofthe July 1992 Helsinki summit
meeting were of crucial importance for institutionaliz-
ing the CSCE process and mapping out a strategy for
mutually reinforcing institutions for security in Europe.
At the June 1991 Berlin Council meeting, the foreign
ministers had encouraged the exchange of information
and relevant documents among
CSCE and other main European and transatlan-
tic institutions.' In Prague, the list of CSCE relation-
ships with international organizations had been ex-
panded to embrace the Council of Europe, the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), NATO, the
WEU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB) 'and other European and trans-
atlantic organizations which may be agreed' with the
aim of inviting them to make contributions to special-
ized CSCE meetings for which they have relevant ex-
pertise.'
At the Helsinki summit meeting, the leaders of
the participating states welcomed the rapid adaptation
of European and transatlantic institutions which were
'increasingly working together to face up to the chal-
lenges before us and to provide a solid foundation for
peace and prosperity".' The meeting laid down guide-
lines for CSCE cooperation with individual organiza-
tions. The Helsinki Document stated that the European
Community, 'fulfilling its important role in the politi-
cal and economic development in Europe ... is closely
involved in CSCE activities'. NATO, through NACC,
'has established patterns of cooperation with new part-
ners in harmony with the process of the CSCE. It has
also offered practical support for the work of the
CSCE'.4 The WEU, stated the Helsinki Document, as
an integral part of the development of the European
Union, is 'opening itself to additional cooperation with
new partners and has offered to provide resources in
support of the CSCE'. 5 A framework of cooperation
was also established linking the CSCE with the Coun-
cil of Europe, the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group
of Twenty Four as well as with the OECD, the ECE
and the EBRD.
The Helsinki Document also indicated possibili-
ties for such regional and sub-regional organizations
as the Council of Baltic States, the Visegrad Triangle,
the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the Central
European Initiative and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States to co-operate with and assist the CSCE.
This list of diverse organizations reflected the exces-
sive bureaucratization of multilateral relations among
European, North American and Central Asian states;
the doubling of the functions and tasks of these insti-
tutions and structures ran the risk that they would be-
come more competitive than compatible in mutual re-
lations, more 'inter-blocking'than interlocking and
more likely to weaken than reinforce each other. The
later developments showed that in general such fears
were unfounded.
Finally the leaders of the participating states
declared their understanding that 'the CSCE is a re-
gional arrangement in the sense of chapter VIII of the
Charter of the United Nations' .6 No enforcement ac-
tion shall be taken under regional arrangements with-
out the authorization of the UN Security Council. The
Helsinki Document reaffirmed that 'The rights and re-
sponsibilities of the Security Council remain unaffected
in their entirety". For the first time this established an
important link between the CSCE and the United Na-
tions or, more broadly, between European and global
security.
One may raise a question: How have these gen-
eral rules functioned in practice over the last two years?
In 1999 European security developments were
dominated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo (the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the war waged
by Russian federal forces in Chechnya, part of the
Russian Federation. In both cases the OSCE played a
specific role in seeking ways of, first, preventing the
use of force, and when it failed, settling peacefully the
conflict situation. The decisions adopted in 1999 at the
NATO summit in Washington and the EU summits in
Cologne and Helsinki are of a special importance for
the recognition of the new role of the OSCE in shap-
ing a European security system.
During that year the OSCE expanded its opera-
tions considerably and strengthened its role as a pri-
mary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention,
conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
New tasks were taken up in Central Asia, the Cauca-
sus and Southeastern Europe. In total, OSCE perma-
nent missions and other forms of field activities en-
compassed 25 different operations," supplemented by
the work of such OSCE institutions as the High Com-
missioner on National Minorities (HC M), the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (in
Warsaw), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the
Media, the OSCE Regional Strategy and the tability
Pact for South Eastern Europe.
3. The OSeE as seen from the
NATO perspective
At the OSCE Seminar on a Common and Com-
prehensive Security Model (Vienna, 18-19 Sep. 1995),
NATO's Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von
Moltke presented the Alliance's view on the future role
of the OSCE and the guiding principles of the future
security model. He also mentioned a number of things
such a security model should stay away from. It should
not:
- cut across existing provisions and achieve-
ments of the OSCE or weaken any existing arms con-
trol and co-operative security achievements;
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- create differences of status between OSCE
member States which could undermine their equal
rights to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence;
- create strategic dividing lines nor be based on
any notion of blocs;
- prejudice the sovereign rights of states to be-
long to or to join security organizations in accordance
with international law and the agreed principles of the
OSCE;
- undermine, directly or indirectly, the transat-
lantic security partnership embodied in the North At-
lantic Alliance and integral to the OSCE;
- encourage any institutional hierarchy.
He pointed out three specific areas central to
the development of a security model, in which NATO
can contribute significantly:
1. Meeting military challenges, particularly through
arms control and disarmament measures;
2. Promoting security and stability in the OSCE area
through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and
Partnership for Peace as well as the inclusion of new
members in the Alliance;
3. Implementing the concept of mutually reinforcing
institutions adopted by the OSCE in Helsinki in 1992.
Four years later the new basic NATO document
(1999), The Alliance s Strategic Concept, defined the
OSCE's role as follows:
'The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the
most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which
also includes Canada and the United States, and plays
an essential role in promoting peace and stability, en-
hancing co-operative security, and advancing democ-
racy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is par-
ticularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy,
contlict prevention, crisis management, and post-con-
tlict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have devel-
oped close practical co-operation, especially with re-
gard to the international effort to bring peace to the
former Yugoslavia. '9
A test of the OSCE's capabilities and limitations
in 1999 was its role in the Balkans, in Kosovo in par-
ticular. In early 1999 it finished the building of the
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was es-
tablished by the Permanent Council on 25 October 1998
to a great extent as a result of the efforts of US Special
Envoy Richard Holbrooke. By far the largest OSCE
operation, it was withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March
1999 because of the grave deterioration of the security
situation and the erosion of its ability to discharge its
tasks. The brief history of the KVM demonstrated that
the OSCE can playa key role only if it has the strong
support of the major powers and the major European
multilateral security institutions.
Recognizing that the Kosovo crisis was in large
part a human rights crisis, the mission had a mandate
to monitor, investigate and document allegations of
human rights violations committed by all parties to the
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conflict. By the time the OSCE-KVM stood down on
9 June 1999, its Human Rights Division had collected
hundreds of in-country repOits and had taken statements
from nearly 2 800 refugees." The published report
describes the organized and systematic nature of the
violations both of human rights and humanitarian law.
Following UN Security Council Resolution
1244 of 1 July 1999, a new OSCE mission was estab-
lished within the UN Interim Administration. This mis-
sion has taken a leading role in the institution- and
democracy-building process and human rights." Its
responsibilities are unprecedented within the OSCE.
Its work covers, among other things, the training of a
new police service and judicial and administrative per-
sonnel.
In Kosovo, the OSCE interacted closely with
the UN, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe. Its
experience in 1999 in the Balkans confirmed the ten-
dency towards a gradual expansion of its security role.
This was also demonstrated in the OSCE regional strat-
egy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
The NATO-led international peace force de-
ployed in Kosovo (KFOR) provided a secure environ-
ment and appropriate support for the OSCE activities
focused on institution-building process, human rights
work and training ofKosovo police. The Brussels ses-
sion of the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting (North
Atlantic Council, 15 December 1999) recommended
its members to intensify cooperation between NATO
and the OSCE, 'notably in the areas of conflict pre-
vention, peace-keeping, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation' .12
From NATO's point of view, of special impor-
tance are military aspects of cooperation with the
OSCE, particularly provisions concerning CSBMs and
the Platform for Cooperative Security. In that context,
interesting is the Report on the Implementation of the
Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
Vienna Agreement) and the Florence Agreement on
Sub-Regional Arms Control. (As a result of the Kosovo
crisis, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suspended
its participation in all types of activities envisaged un-
der the Florence Agreement. The participation was re-
sumed only in late summer 1999). However the imple-
mentation of inspections and visits to the Weapons
Manufacturing Facilities have been satisfactorily com-
pleted. All inspections, as envisaged in Article IV (sub-
regional arms control), have been conducted. As the
Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office
stated, the steps ahead which should facilitate the pas-
sage from a stability based on a structurally unstable
balance of power to a co-operative security system in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole sub-region are
still fairly modest. I)
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4. The Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe
The EU initiative of 10 June 1999 to launch a
Stability Pact in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis re-
flects an integrated, comprehensive and coherent ap-
proach to the entire region." The concept of the Sta-
bility Pact was (a) to isolate and limit the Kosovo cri-
sis, and (b) to develop in a more coordinated way a
political framework for promoting stability in south-
eastern Europe. The concept is innovative, although
in its essence it is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan
.offered to post-war Europe by the United States in 1947.
Two essential distinctions, however, are to be stressed,
unlike the Marshall Plan, the Stability Pact does not
reflect a consolidated strategy implemented under the
leadership of one global power-the United States, but
divergent national strategies of many European states
and non-governmental international organizations and
financial institutions; and, second, South Eastern Eu-
rope is addressed conceptually as a coherent political
and economic area, while, in fact, it is rather divided
than united, and the states of the region are more com-
petitive in their mutual relations than cooperative. In
the long term the Stability Pact offers those countries
in the region, which seek integration in the Euro-At-
lantic structures a prospect of achieving this, especially
in the context of their aspirations to join the EU.
The FRY is not a participant. Bodo Hombach
(Germany), appointed in July 1999 as Special Co-
ordinator of the Stability Pact, noted that it remains a
central problem and challenge: '[as] soon as Yugosla-
via has solved its political problems, it can and should
become a participant in the Stability Pact with full rights.
Until then, the Stability Pact will reach out to the demo-
cratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro' Y He pointed
out that the process launched with the signing of the
Pact is not directed against the people of the FRY; what
is more, it opens up a prospect of their future integra-
tion into the Euro-Atlantic structures as full partners.
The decision-making bodies of the Stability Pact
consist of a system of three working tables addressing
issues similar to the 'baskets' of the Helsinki process
established 25 years before: (a) democratization and
the promotion of civil societies; (b) economic devel-
opment; and (c) internal and external security. The re-
sults of the working tables are brought together at the
Regional Table. The members are the states, which are
participants in the Stability Pact and other institutions
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
financial institutions by invitation. A novelty of the
Stability Pact process is that all the members of the
working tables enjoy full equality. The Pact did not
create any new organization or structure but made it
possible for all interested states and international or-
ganizations to collaborate under OSCE auspices. Some
progress has already been noted in the work of all the
working groups. 16
The Sarajevo Summit Declaration of heads of
state and government, issued on 30 July 1999, con-
firmed the commitments undertaken under the Stabil-
ity Pact. Two aspects of the process initiated in Co-
logne and endorsed in Sarajevo are central: (a) pro-
moting political and economic reforms, development
and enhanced security; and (b) facilitating the integra-
tion of south-east European countries into the Euro-
Atlantic structures. The Sarajevo Declaration contained
a message addressed to the people of the FRY 'to em-
brace democratic change and work actively for regional
reconciliation'. With this intention, the participants at
the Sarajevo Summit decided to 'consider ways of
making the Republic of Montenegro an early benefici-
ary of the pact' and reaffirmed their support to all demo-
cratic forces. 17
The philosophy reflected in both the Stability
Pact and the Sarajevo Declaration is to engage the coun-
tries of the region in security cooperation and in the
democratic transformation and reconstruction of South-
eastern Europe. They bear the main responsibility for
its stabilization and their actions are of critical impor-
tance. The other state signatories of both documents
undertook to support these actions in order 'to accel-
erate the transition in the region to stable democracies,
prosperous market economies and open and pluralis-
tic societies in which human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities, are respected, as an important step
in their integration into Euro-Atlantic and global insti-
tutions' .18
The main challenge for all European security
institutions is to build in Kosovo and other countries
of the region a multi-ethnic society on the basis of sub-
stantial autonomy while still respecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of existing states, including the
FRY. The decisions taken in 1999 by NATO, the EU
and the OSCE demonstrated the need for a broader
view of the region: regional cooperation should be a
catalyst for the integration of the Southeast European
countries into broader structures. The Istanbul Sum-
mit Declaration states that the OSCE 'has a key role to
play in contributing to [the Stability Pact's] success' .19
In fact, the problems that face the signatories of the
documents adopted in Cologne and Sarajevo - ensur-
ing democratic development, political pluralism and
respect for the rights of individuals and minorities
within states as well as the integrity of those states -
concern almost all conflict situations. They are the very
problems the OSCE was set up to deal with and, al-
though often associated with developments in the area
of former Yugoslavia, they are also the main cause of
instability in the former Soviet space. The links be-
tween the European Union and the OSCE are reflected
in all documents adopted as Presidency reports of the
European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki and, recently,
in Santa Maria da Feira (19-20 June 2000). The Portu-
guese Presidency stressed, in the context of the com-
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mon European Security and Defence Policy, 'the
strengthening of military and non-military crisis man-.
agement and conflict prevention' . Also the importance
has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relation-
ship in crisis management by the Union between the
military and civilian fields, as well as 'cooperation
between the El.I-rapidly evolving crisis management
capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Eu-
rope' .20
5. The OSeE and the new
security responses
As it was rightly pointed out, both the Platform
for Co-operative Security and the Charter for Euro-
pean Security propose a set of arrangements 'for closer
ties and cooperation between the OSCE and other in-
ternational institutions which-together with the opera-
tional guidelines for a more effective OSCE-are directly
relevant to NATO's role in Europe."
The Istanbul Summit Declaration reaffirmed
several essential elements that make up a new type of
security system in Europe. First, except for the dispute,
which has lasted for more than 10 years between Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, all the
conflicts the OSCE has dealt with are essentially of a
domestic character. Even so, none of the states con-
cerned, including Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Macedo-
nia, Moldova and Ukraine, has questioned the legiti-
macy or role of the OSCE in seeking peaceful solu-
tions, nor has Russia questioned the right of interna-
tional organizations, including the mandate of the
OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, which is to as-
sist in the renewal of a political dialogue and initiate
the process of finding a lasting, comprehensive solu-
tion to the problem there. The second aspect is the com-
mitment to apply in practice the acknowledged princi-
ples and norms, including respect for human rights and
the rights of minorities, condemnation and rejection of
'ethnic cleansing', and support for the unconditional
and safe return of refugees and internally displaced
persons. The third element, which is of key importance
for ensuring stability in the OSCE area, is overall sup-
port for a policy of tolerance and for a multi-ethnic
society 'where the rights of all citizens and the rule of
law are respectedf but there is no intention to under-
mine or call into question the sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity of the states to whom decisions of the
international community are addressed.
The meeting at Istanbul faced the question of
Russia's use of force on a mass scale in Chechnya.
The use of violence and terror against the civilian popu-
lation as a whole and recourse to the rule of 'collective
responsibility' -holding the population at large answer-
able for the crimes of the few, as has been seen in
Chechnya-cannot be equated with combating terror-
ism. Russia's reaction to the criticism of the interna-
tional community in the period up to the Istanbul Sum-
mit Meeting came close to jeopardizing the successful
conclusion of the meeting," but it was not broken off,
and several important documents were adopted. How-
ever, the price of this 'moderate success' was the ap-
plication of a double standard: the OSCE in practice
made greater demands of the small and medium-sized
states and was more lenient towards the major powers,
especially Russia, regarding violations of their inter-
national commitments." The result was seriously to
erode the OSCE's authority and demonstrate its limits
in enforcing its principles.
In the confrontation between principles and
practice, the latter won. Since OSCE decisions are
taken by consensus, the documents adopted reflect the
balance of interests. In effect, a political compromise
made it possible to agree on several essential new steps
which are to facilitate the implementation of OSCE
principles and norms and make more effective its de-
cisions aimed at preventing the outbreak of violent
conflict wherever possible.
The Charter for European Security, signed at Istanbul
on 19 November 1999 by 54 OSCE heads of states
and government (excluding the FRY, reflects the ex-
perience and the crises of recent years and adapts the
OSCE principles and norms to the new needs.
The decision to prepare a Common and Com-
prehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21 st Cen-
tury was taken at the Budapest Summit Meeting of the
OSCE in December 1994.25 It stemmed from the twin
needs (a) to give expression to fundamental changes
and define the new risks and challenges, and (b) to
develop new instruments, which would be not only
expedients but also part of a broader system and mecha-
nism of conflict prevention." Over more than five years
of negotiations since then, hundreds of proposals have
been made which reflect differing visions of a Euro-
pean security system and different concepts of the
OSCE's role in such a system. Russia demanded a hi-
erarchical and normative order, which would reaffirm
legal and international treaty commitments. The EU
states, differences among them notwithstanding, were
inclined towards more pragmatic solutions."
The main new elements in the Charter are new
steps, means and mechanisms to enhance the role of
the OSCE as a key instrument for early warning, con-
flict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict
rehabilitation; it does not seek yet again to determine
new or reinterpret old principles.
Agreement was reached on six new types of
activity: (a) a Platform for Cooperative Security, the
aim of which is to strengthen cooperation between the
OSCE and other international organizations and insti-
tutions and thus make better use of the resources of
the international community; (b) the development of
the OSCE's role in peacekeeping operations; (c) the
creation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation
Teams (REACT) to enable the OSCE to respond
quickly to requests for assistance, to offer civilian and
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police expertise in conflict situations, to deploy the
civilian component of peacekeeping operations quickly
and to address problems before they become crises;
(d) the expansion of the OSCE's ability to do police-
related work, including police monitoring, training and
assisting in maintaining the primacy of law; (e) the
establishment of an Operation Centre at the OSCE
Secretariat in Vienna to facilitate preparation, planning
and rapid deployment of OSCE field operations; and
(f) the establishment of a Preparatory Committee un-
der the OSCE Permanent Council to strengthen the
consultation process. 28
The Charter is designed much more for opera-
tional tasks than was originally assumed or expected. It
reaffirms states' duty to respect human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, including 'the rights of persons be-
longing to national minorities' .29 This is not an innova-
tive provision: such commitments were contained in
numerous documents and conventions adopted within
the UN system, in the Council of Europe, in the 1975
Helsinki Final Act and in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a
New Europe. A new provision, however, is that intema-
tional security and peace must be enhanced through a
dual approach: 'we must build confidence among peo-
ple within States and strengthen cooperation between
States' .30
Also new are the instruments and mechanisms
to assist and consolidate state bodies in activities that
would traditionally be seen as falling within the com-
petence and discretionary power of the individual state.
In their security policies, states should be guided by
'equal partnership, solidarity and transparency'.
An essential element of the Charter for Euro-
pean Security is an elaborate code of conduct of the
OSCE in its cooperation with other organizations." It
recognizes the integrating role that the OSCE can play,
without creating a hierarchy of organizations or a per-
manent division of labour among them. The Platform
for Co-operative Security, adopted within the Charter,
can be considered a new stage in the development of
the concept reflected in the Code of Conduct on Po-
litico-Military Aspects of Security contained in the
1994 Budapest Document. 32 The Charter stated:
'The risks and challenges we face today cannot
be met by a single State or organization. (...) In order
to make full use of the resources of the international
community, we are committed to even closer coopera-
tion among international organizations. (...) Through
this Platform [for Co-operative Security] we seek to
develop and maintain political and operational coher-
ence, on the basis of shared values, among all the vari-
ous bodies dealing with security, both in responding to
specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks
and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role
that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when ap-
propriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to fos-
ter cooperation, through which various organizations
can reinforce each other drawing on their particular
strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of
organizations or a permanent division of labour among
them. We are ready in principle to deploy the resources
of international organizations and institutions of which
we are members in support of the OSCE's work, sub-
ject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.
Sub-regional cooperation has become an impor-
tant element in enhancing security across the OSCE
area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the aus-
pices of the OSCE, help to promote our common val-
ues. They contribute to improved security not just in
the sub-region in question but throughout the OSCE
area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Plat-
form for Cooperative Security, as a forum for sub-re-
gional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance
with the modalities in the operational document, the
OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and
experience between sub-regional groups and may, if
so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords
and agreements.' 33
Two follow-up conferences, in 1997 and 1999,
confirmed states' adherence to the 1994 Code of Con-
duct and the principle of democratic control of armed
forces, which it emphasized. A suggestion was raised
at the OSCE Review Conference in June 1999 that the
issue of corruption in defence spending should be ad-
dressed. To promote transparency, it was suggested that
information exchanges based on national responses to
the questionnaire on implementation of countries'
OSCE commitments could be made public on an
Internet site." The Charter for European Security re-
affirmed the validity of the Code of Conduct and de-
clared that the signatory states will consult promptly
'with a participating State seeking assistance in realiz-
ing its right to individual or collective defence in the
event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and po-
litical independence are threatened' .35 In other words,
the Charter reflects a new political commitment to con-
sider jointly the nature of threats and actions that may
be required in defence of common values.
Today, the essence of security is rightly seen not
exactly through the prism of businesslike contacts in
secondary matters, but in the search for an answer to
the questions: what is the architecture of future secu-
rity in Europe to be like? Which organizations are to
play the key role: NATO and the EU or the OSCE? It
is not a secret that in the debate on a model of future
European security a concept has been brought up to
give the OSCE a character and status of the main secu-
rity structure. A question arises whether such hierar-
chical approach is needed.
Another issue is whether-and if so, then which
ofthem the existing organizations in Europe might play
the key role in the new security system.
It is true that practical experience has shown that
a single organization seldom meets all the necessary
political, humanitarian and military needs in the man-
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agement and settlement of a major crisis. Thus, the
OSCE must establish closer working relations both with
NATO and the EU, the only two organizations in the
Euro-Atlantic area with political and military capabili-
ties and internationally recognized legal mandate to
authorize peacekeeping and enforcement operations."
It is all the more so as the picture of the OSCE as a
weak and fair-weather organization is quite common.
An illustration of this is the report entitled Russia in
the system a/international relations in the coming dec-
ade, prepared five years ago by the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), one
of the most authoritative research centres of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences. It reflects much better the
real understanding of the present and future role of the
OSCE, as seen from the Russian perspective, than many
official statements and declarations:
'Looking into the nearest future, it is very diffi-
cult to imagine a situation in which the OSCE would
genuinely provide the main pillar of European stability.
Balance and universalism of this inter-state structure,
which are necessary for lowering the tensions of inter-
bloc antagonism, are proving insufficient in the new cir-
cumstances even for settling an individual conflict, let
alone ensuring security and stability on the pan-Euro-
pean scale. The capacities of the OSCE at present and
for the foreseeable future are quite rigidly limited, on
both the institutional and operational levels. It is and
will not be able to provide a considerable military-po-
litical force. The "common denominator" of security
interests and stability is insufficient to meet the specific
interests of participating states in the sphere of foreign
policy and to form among them a leading body which
would operate in accordance with a future OSCE Stat-
ute, a legally binding document'. (!MEMO, Moscow,
1995).
Developments of the recent five years confirmed
that the authors' reasoning struck a note of realism.
The same authors affirmed that: 'NATO will sur-
vive in the foreseeable future, all changes notwithstand-
ing, through internal transformation and adaptation to
the changing circumstances. However, the very fact of
retaining the immense concentration of the bloc's mili-
tary potential will not pose a danger to Russia's secu-
rity, because it's main direction is [set] at maintaining
the stability in Europe and out of its area. Considering
that even in the period of confrontation NATO did not
have an offensive potential at its disposal, all the more it
is characteristic for the present and future conditions'. 37
The authors of the study, like many others, expressed
concern about the reconstruction of the security system
in Europe which, on the one hand, would lead to NATO's
expansion, and, on the other hand, could do harm to the
national interests of Russia. Nevertheless, they reject
arguments about a threat to Russia posed by 'NATO
aggressiveness', etc. What is more, they found the Alli-
ance 'the main factor of stability on the continent'. Al-
though this state of affairs is not always compatible with
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Russia's interests, one should, in the opinion of the
!MEMO authors, consider the 'Westernization' ofCen-
tral and Eastern Europe, following that of Southern and
Northern Europe, 'an objective, historically warranted
process' .38 Russia faces two alternatives: either coop-
eration with the whole of Europe in all fields including
the security and arms control sphere or a return to con-
frontation and the policy of enmity towards the West.
Ten years after the end of the cold war, the reali-
ties that determine the transatlantic agenda are com-
pletely changed. The decisions adopted by and arrange-
ments made within NATO, the EU and the OSCE have
taken these changes into account and set out a new con-
ceptual framework for the further shaping of the secu-
rity system in Europe. These three security-related struc-
tures are adapting internally; NATO and the EU have
initiated the process of enlargement eastwards. The
OSCE Charter for European Security codified a set of
arrangements for closer cooperation between all secu-
rity-related international institutions existing in Europe.
The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the bloody con-
flict in Chechnya in 1999 were the litmus test of the
effectiveness and, at the same time, of the limitations,
which these multilateral security institutions have en-
countered in their attempts to prevent and resolve con-
flicts.
The NATO, EU and OSCE documents are the
expression of the new role played by the multinational
security organizations and reflect the process of rede-
fining national interest. The decisions regarding secu-
rity adopted in 1999/2000 give expression to the con-
cept that political and operational coherence is possi-
ble if it is based on common values and in close coop-
eration between all the bodies dealing with transatlan-
tic security. Important is to adopt decisions on coop-
eration and work out its procedures and mechanisms.
More important, however, is how these decisions are
implemented in practice. The Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe is exemplary. At a regional funding
conference (29-30 March 2000), international donors
pledgedz.a million euros earmarked for divergent
projects under the auspices of the Pact. No doubt, this
showed the measure of commitment of states, the Un-
ion and non-governmental organizations, and a con-
crete contribution to stability in the region. However,
it is premature to assess whether these decisions will
lead to the expected outcome: replacing violence and
terror by cooperation and respect for human rights.
Operation of such instruments as the Stability Pact is
of a long-term character; restoration of normality be-
tween peoples in the region is a generation matter. The
OSCE's role in restoring stability is less spectacular
than NATO military operations or EU economic as-
sistance. Nevertheless, it is no less essential. It pro-
motes the building of democratic institutions and the
shaping of security based on the respect for common
values. •
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